The Eulogy for the Forever Damned
The Joyful Song of the Sirin Bird
“Those who don’t know the truth are fools, but those who know the truth and call it a lie are criminals.” Bertolt Brecht
On March 2nd, at 4:55pm, technically 5 minutes before the official closing time of the cemetery, the stream of people coming to pay their respects for the second day in a row was still moving through the gates. Navalny’s grave literally buried under a giant mound of flowers.
Seeing all of the pictures and videos of thousands of people reminded me of pandemonium that I witnessed 34 years ago when thousands of mourners came to Bogoslovskoe Cemetery in then still Leningrad to bid farewell to their hero, Russian first punk rock star. It also reminded me of the funerals of Soviet leaders and even the rare footage of Vysotkiy’s funeral from the American TV:
It felt like a funeral not just for Navalny, but for the kind of Russia that might have existed had he been allowed to live and to challenge Putin in a free and fair election. Regardless of the platform, there’s been nearly universal outpouring of support, appreciation and borderline canonization of a man who came to represent the opposition to the ruthless authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin. Even Putin, allegedly was concerned with the memorial services and held multiple meetings with top-ranking FSB officials.
The fact that so many people defied the official pressure and the possibility if not likelihood of being beaten or arrested to pay their respects to Navalny clearly demonstrated his status as the leader of the opposition. There were even some flickers of bravery and defiance through chants of “Russia will be free,” but the days when Navalny would lead tens of thousands on marches through Moscow, smiling even as he was inevitably dragged away by police, are now a faint memory.
The mood was understandably somber for the occasion, the recently departed saint-to-be brought sorrow and grief, at times bordering on fatalism. For example, Julia Ioffe twitted:
When I started seriously studying Russia in college, my dad, who fled the place as a refugee, couldn’t understand it.
“Why do you need this?” he said. “This is a country without a future!”
I didn’t agree with him then, or when I lived in Russia.
Now I understand what he meant
I don’t think either Julia or her father or most of my own family and friends really do understand, truly do grok the fullness of it.
On the day that the world learned of Aleksey Navalny’s death, I posted pithily, “there is a nuanced difference between an opposition leader and a rival.” I stand by those words and that’s exactly what so many either do not understand or simply refuse to accept. Navalny, for all of his anti-corruption rhetoric and populist demagoguery is just as much a product of the system as is Putin. They just happen to be two different sides of the same coin: Putin is the direct catharsis of the siloviki; whereas Navalny is a child of the rise of oligarchs during the upheaval of the 1990s.
The challenge for most in the West is in perceiving Russia under Putin as a reboot of USSR, Putin’s own words, his reminisce of the good old times and regrets of what has been lost, making it very easy to fall into this trap for anyone, including experts like General Hodges.
Quite the contrary, rebuilding or maintaining USSR, is the very last item on Putin’s agenda. Whilst he happily uses the nostalgia of “Soviet prosperity” for his own gains, he is slowly, but very surely transforming the regime into House of Romanov 2.01. Objectively, once you shed established preconceptions and biases, it becomes rather difficult to draw many parallels between USSR and Russia under Putin today. Once you account for the aggressive expansionism, the cult of the personality, the hatred towards the West, and everyday racism, there’s not much else that is similar, and the very same parallels can be made with Peter the Great’s Russia.
Not everyone across the vast decay of the former empire felt the same. Many in “autonomous” ethnic regions and “republics” withing Russian Federation, as well as across former Central Asian and Caucus soviet republics took to social media to complain about the vigils setup at memorials to those who died in the 1932-1933 Soviet orchestrated artificial famine, seeing it as disrespectful to honor Navalny at sites dedicated to people he degenirated.
“I wasn’t going to say anything, but this was the straw that broke the camel’s — my — back. It strikes one as deeply inappropriate for a professional association … to formally organize a memorial reading for a Russian politician, whoever he might be. Does one really need to draw parallels from 20th-century history in order to make this clear?” Oleh Kotsyuba, who manages publications at Harvard University’s Ukrainian Research Institute, wrote on Twitter after the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages organized a poetry reading for Navalny at its annual conference.
For many of his supporters, Navalny's far-right, Russian etho-nationalist past is little more than an unfortunate blunder, a youthful mistake, an unimportant page of history that can be easily skimmed over and dismissed as having taking place years if not decades ago. This is not surprising, given that most Russians and those Russian-speaking minorities who think of themselves as “white” or “Slavic” or “Russian,” still do not or refuse to realize the scale of the problem that has prevailed in Russia: the flourishing of ethno-nationalism and institutionalized discrimination and at time outright violence against all non-white people (mainly people from the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia). For example, in 2008, according to the Sova research center and the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, over 600 people were recorded as victims of ethnic hatred, of which 116 were murders. We lack the statistics on the assault, beatings and murders that were committed through the years of Soviet regime against “non-white” minorities, often non-ethnic Russians were afraid to turn to the law enforcement, fearing they would discriminate against them as mercilessly as the people they are supposed to apprehend.
The backlash seemingly got to the point where one of the top experts on Russia proclaimed that it is “getting more coverage than” it deserves. I happen to be one of the people with a clear addiction to the news cycle, specifically on Twitter, and while I follow a wide range of people, opinions and perspectives, I can hardly say that there’s been enough coverage regarding this issues. Moreover, unlike Mark, I feel that these issues are while being historical are just as critical today. In 2021, Amnesty International revoked Navalny’s “prisoner of conscience” status for the openly racist and xenophobic videos that Navalny made in the early 2000s. "Navalny has not publicly denounced his YouTube videos so our idea is that somehow he can relate to what he said," Amnesty's Alexander Artemev explained. "He cannot be a prisoner of conscience: that is someone who never advocates hate or violence or uses hate speech.2”
Like most of the elites in the modern Russia, Navalny’s worldview was formed during the years of attempting to establish free market economy in the 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, he joined the liberal party Yabloko. By his own account, he was a classic neoliberal, supporting a regime of low public spending, radical privatization, reduction of social guarantees, “small government,” and total freedom for business. However, Navalny quickly realized that a purely liberal platform has no prospect of success in Russia as the ideology was discredited by the radical reforms of the 1990s. It became associated with poverty, injustice, inequality, humiliation, and corruption. Once the supposedly pro-Western liberal ideology had lost so much luster in the eyes of the population, it ceased to be of interest to the ruling class either. Following Vladimir Putin, Russian officials, politicians, and oligarchs proclaimed themselves as patriots and true inheritors of the Russian state. Liberal ideology turned out to be of no use to anyone.
Rather quickly, Navalny found his new ideological niche. In the early 2000s, he proclaimed himself a nationalist, which of course meant far-right Russian ethno-nationalist. He regularly participated in the far-right Russian Marches, waged war on “illegal immigration,” and even launched campaign to “Stop Feeding the Caucasus” directed against government subsidies to poor, ethnic minority-populated autonomous regions in the Caucasus Mountains.
In a of time of wide-spread right-wing sentiments, many that have been brewing and growing since the 90s, Navalny was not an exception. Famous TV newscaster Alexander Nevzorov and a rock star Konstantin Kinchev had similar trajectory swings toward Russian ethno-nationalism, among many others. The circumstances were ideal and to a large degree Navalny’s gambit worked. He had quickly risen to become the de facto head of Russia's anti-Kremlin opposition.
While it is absolutely true that Navalny has done as much as any other single person in exposing corruption at the core of Russian regime, significant part of Navalany’s rise was due to his very open and quite public immersion into the Russian far-right ethno-nationalist circles. In the west, this meteoric ascension was almost entirely promoted to be based on his relentless exposure of high-level hypocrisy and corruption and consistent demand for fair elections. Many in the Western politics, media, etc. spent considerable resources and efforts to whitewash Navalany’s image and character, something that continues to this day. I have immense respect to Bellingcat in general and both Elliot Higgins and Christo Grozev, but both, especially Christo, hold a significant responsibility for obfuscating Navalny’s underlying nature.
Стань националистом!3
It is worth exploring how Navalny’s nationalism often embraced the same positions that have become central to Putin’s espoused beliefs. Until at least 2014, Navalny viewed Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as one people of shared culture, denying both Moscow’s oppressive history and the countries’ distinct identities. The idea of a veritable Eastern Slavic trinity of Russia-Ukraine-Belarus is gospel for Putin, at least until it was time to de-nazify Ukraine for unwillingness to be part of the Russian ethnonationalist empire.
In 2007, Navalny developed political connections and relationships with the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DNPI), now outlawed in Russia), which organized and led the “Russia March” in major urban areas across the country. These marches galvanized far-right and skinhead groups alongside ordinary ethnic Russians against the perceived overrunning of Russia by migrants and immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Navalny not only joined the march, he joined the march’s organizing committee. Slogans such as “Russia for Russians” and various racial slurs against visible minorities abounded. That same year, he founded the group “Narod,” meaning “people,” which supported the ethnic nationalist themes and ideals employed by the DNPI.
He has also endorsed a nationalist-led campaign called Stop Feeding the Caucasus that has called for ending federal subsidies to the "corrupt" and "ineffective" governments of Chechnya and other North Caucasus republics. "Those of us who are here, we know and believe that there are also 'normal' people in the Caucasus -- not only those freaks who are in power. We know that there are girls there whose life's ambition is not about being wrapped up in a burqa and having 25 children, but about living a decent life like humans. There are young people who want to study and work -- and their ideal of life is not a Porsche Cayenne and a golden gun," he told a Stop Feeding the Caucasus rally in October 2011.
Navalny, also supported Russia in its war against Georgia in August 2008, using a derogatory term for Georgians in some of his blog posts and calling for all Georgians to be expelled from Russia. While he had offered a barely plausible apology for the racist epithet, but says he stands by the other positions he took at that time.
"The Georgian public felt betrayed by Navalny after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Everyone expected Navalny to be anti-Putin and anti-imperialist, but he supported the invasion. Georgian national interest is not wanting to be part of any new empire that derives from the old Soviet playbook. Navalny's comments indicate he's not against the regime in that regard." Kornely Kakachia, Political Science Professor at Tbilisi State University.
Similarly, according to the political scientist Marlene Laurelle, Navalny also tweeted and wrote in support of the Biryulevo riots of 2013, in which thousands of people engaged in violence against ethnic minorities. He has at various times called for deporting illegal immigrants and introducing a visa regime for the countries of Central Asia.
Engelina Tareyeva, who worked with Navalny before he was expelled from Yabloko in 2007, accused him of regularly using racial slurs and developing his relationship with people based on their ethnicity. "I consider Aleksei Navalny the most dangerous man in Russia. You don't have to be a genius to understand that the most horrific thing that could happen in our country would be the nationalists coming to power."
In an interview in January 2013, Navalny presented his nationalist agenda, including combating illegal immigration and ethnically based organized-crime groups; protecting ethnic Russians abroad; and bringing order to the North Caucasus, which he has called a de facto lawless "off-shore zone."
Journalist Aider Muzhdabayev had a public exchange of letters with Navalny about his nationalist positions, which led Aider to state that:
"Maybe we vote with our hearts, and we value sincerity. Some people might like what he said; some people might not like it. But I appreciate that he answered sincerely. We got a political portrait of a man who we knew mostly from his battle against corruption -- his noble and selfless struggle, which I support 100 percent. Now we have learned how he emotionally, as a person, [reacts]."
In the end, journalist Matvei Ganapolsky said it best, when referring to Navalny in those early 2000s: "I am completely pragmatic in my attitude toward Navalny. For me, he is a tool. His opinions about the authorities in Moscow, about the anti-Kremlin mood, completely correspond to my own. I want to see honest elections in Moscow. I don't have any other candidate."
Navalny’s pseudo evolution from a full-throated ethnic nationalist to anti-corruption crusader clearly shows the trajectory of Russian nationalist movement trying to mainstream ethnic nationalism. Accusations of political corruption were part of the anti-immigration platform of Russian nationalist groups from the mid-2000s. According to a 2008 report from the SOVA Research Center, DNPI made the decision to shift its strategy from the far-right ethnonationalism to “nationalism in the European sense” as a means of legitimizing the group’s political activity.
Although Navalny dropped his “Russia for Russians” slogan, it remained a thread in his political platform, woven through the anti-corruption rhetoric. In 2015, Navalny juxtaposed Europe’s struggle with terrorism to Russia’s increasing number of Muslim migrants from Central Asia and decried how easily “Islamists” could enter the country due to its lax immigration policy, once again an aspect of corruption. He wrote, “So, if in Europe there is an ‘orgy of tolerance’ towards Islamists, then in Russia it is simply a Sodom and Gomorrah of lies, hypocrisy, corruption and direct encouragement of aggressive Islamism.” Navalny’s nationalist rhetoric against corruption is in line with the contemporary politics of far-right groups such as Afd in Germany and Geert Wilders’ Dutch Party for Freedom, whose comments about Ukrainian refugees mirror Navalny’s on Central Asian migrants, Marine LePen and others..
Navalny, at times, partially walked back some of his discriminatory and racist comments: for example, he apologized for supporting Russia’s bombing of Georgia in 2008. Yet, he usually objected when asked by journalists about his views on nationalism, suggesting that he had not changed his views at all, even if he no longer publicly shared them during his rallies and videos.
In 2016, when asked about his “rodents” comment, Navalny tried to change the conversation to the topic of corruption; on a follow up, he apologized for his “non-politically correct” slur, but still claimed that his overall position has not changed since then:
In a 2017 interview with The Guardian, Navalny stood by his nationalist comments and argued that his juxtaposition of Chechens with cockroaches was an “artistic license.” Also in 2017, when preparing for the debates with Strelkov (aka Igor Girkin), Navalny provided his perspective on what are the most critical issues facing Russia.
Shockingly, it was the same platform as a decade ago, simply without the derogatory slurs and in a much better and more respectable “packaging.”
In 2019, Navalny reiterated his call for a strict visa regime between Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia on the basis of religious radicalism and so-called cultural differences. Mind you, no visas would be necessary for the Western countries, or Ukraine under this plan. While Putin moved toward the right and adapted Navalny’s nationalism, Navalny himself maintained that Russia and the West were fundamentally different from the “other” represented by Muslims from Central Asia and the Caucasus.
In other words, going back almost a quarter of a century, Navalny remarks are not incidental or momentary. They reflect a very consistent ultranationalist vision. If you pay close attention, there's no sign of remorse, guilt or any change. While he may have occasionally apologized for the slurs, he claims his views haven't changed. In other words, the only noticeable change is in the self-censorship of slurs and a more “respectful” tone and voice of the racist demagoguery.
People can change, but that requires integrity, honesty and accountability. The "Reformed Navalny" narrative is anything but…
The canonization of Navalny today started with the whitewashing and repacking of Navalny’s image for the Western consumption as far back as his rise to fame and power. Kamil Galeev summarizes this phenomenon very well:
Global narrative on Russia is shaped by the major Western media/scholars.
Both journos and scholars are (mostly) clueless. Most have no other sources in Russia other than the Moscow establishment4.
The Moscow establishment is interested in minimal, cosmetic changes.
Moscow establishment is mortally terrified of the system being dismantled. It would undermine their privilege.
They provide Western media/academia with facts selected and interpretations constructed to justify the minimal change narrative.
Since most of the Western media/academia have no other sources than the Moscow establishment they form their opinion based on facts selected and interpretations constructed by the latter. Respectable Western institutions do perspective laundering for the Moscow establishment.
Since the narrative promoted by the mainstream Western media largely amounts to the laundered perspective of the Moscow establishment, the Westerners are genuinely astonished with either Ukrainians/Russian minorities/regionalists questioning the said "objective" narrative.
Hence the differing views on Navalny's imperial succession. Those who see the imperial system as an asset will fight for him till the last breath. That's their only chance, realistically speaking. Those who see it as a liability or threat tend to hold very different opinions.
Navalny's platform is the platform of the cosmetic changes. Since the Moscow establishment interested in only cosmetic changes hold the monopoly of representation, their perspective becomes the mainstream Western perspective. Nobody else is given voice.
The question of Navalny’s succession is the question of cosmetic vs fundamental changes of the Russian sociopolitical system. If you don't get it, you won't get why so many Ukrainians/Russian minorities stand against it while the Moscow "liberals" are for it.
In this quest to rebrand Navalny’s image, first Russian establishment and then Western media had to distort or misrepresent facts. They failed to call him out on his outright lie, they misrepresented the navalnist propaganda, they made an Oscar-winning depiction of his martyrdom. In order to match the image, Navalny became likely the first politician in the entire history of the Russian state who openly and successfully promoted himself as a “good family man,” akin to the stereotypical Western, especially American politicians.
Of course, it’s not a surprise, the human nature yearns for a white knight, a savior and after a lengthy campaign of terror against the opposition leaders by Putin, Navalny was left as the only possible candidate, and with his charisma, picture-perfect family and growing support, how could you not cut a few corners in the name of the greater good?
The irony is the perception that Navalny would be a democratic leader, unlike Putin, whereas all of the available factual information paints Navalny with the same brushstrokes as his nemesis. Navalny’s responses and reactions to criticism of his ethnonationalist past are very telling. He denies it, he attacks those who attempt to accuse him, he does not take an ounce of responsibility. That’s how he was without any power. Imagine how he would act if he had the entirety of Russian state at his disposal?5
While the reception and opinions on Navalny across Caucasus and Central Asia are easily understandable, I’ve seen plenty of musings on why are so many Ukrainians skeptical of Russian ‘liberal’ opposition in general and Navalny specifically? This article quoting Mariam Nalem is still as relevant today as it was a year ago.
The “Crimea question” had been a clear and valid thorn in otherwise nearly pristine reputation Navalny built in the West. When Navalny was pressed regarding Russian illegal occupation in 2014, Navalny replied, “Is Crimea some sort of sausage sandwich to be passed back and forth? I don’t think so.” The response, obviously outraged Ukrainians, who are no strangers to annexation as an embodiment of Russian imperialist doctrine. When Navalny was arrested in 2021 upon his heroic return to Russia after the failed assassination attempt by the FSO, addressing his arrest, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said, "I am sure that he would have to give back the sandwich. Not bitten but fresh and in good condition." Kuleba added that Navalny would need to apologize to Ukraine if he ever got elected to power in a democratic election.
Last year, in the midst of the war, Navalny attempted to change his position on Ukraine and issued a fifteen point manifesto. To his credit, Navalny did state that it is a war of aggression that was started under “ridiculous pretext.” He admits to the destruction of Ukrainian cities and the war crimes that have been committed. Yet, at no point does he offer an apology or a remorse, his own ethnonationalist imperialism making him muse:
The reality of the manifesto is that the fate of the Ukrainians and the responsibility of Russian society for their suffering is only a minor issue for Navalny and likely only due to the optics of it. For Navalny this is Putin's war, he repeatedly exonerates everyone except Putin: “President Putin has unleashed an unjust war…. he is desperately trying to make this a people’s war.” He simply can’t help his own nature. The consequences of the war to Russia, is what important through Navalny's anti-war rhetoric. It may seem logical and pragmatic for a Russian politician to focus on his own nation but it highlights that any reconciliation with and future repatriation to Ukraine are largely an afterthought. Navalany is not even shy about this:
Navalny’s manifesto is a prime example of the Russian imperialistic discourse being unaware of itself. Maria Buchelnikova, a Ukrainian journalist notes, "you may say that it's not that essential, but that's the main problem with Russia and Russians: They can't admit and face their imperialistic ambitions." Navalny and his team used the anti-war narrative for their own benefit, e.g. in a hopeless attempt to free him.
This is true of not just Navalny. In March of 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave an interview to four Russian journalists. None of the four journalists, by the established norms, liberal Russians, even attempted to offer an apology. Not a single one of them apparently thought of expressing regret that their country started a war of aggression against Ukraine. Mikhail Zygar, one of the journalists and former editor in chief of TV channel Dozhd’ said: "I have to admit that I did not think of apologizing.” He adds, "Russia was a murderous empire that oppressed its neighbors, and Ukraine in particular, for the past 300 years, the heroes of Russian history are villains and warriors." He argues that it it will be difficult for many Russians to understand that the story they were taught from their childhood was incredibly biased and distorted. "We are all victims of this narrative, it will take a long time for us to understand this, but we have to understand it." Zygar is a lot closer to the truth than Julia Ioffe or her dad. Yet, he still views himself and his compatriots as the victims! I am sure that the couple hundred thousands of Russians whose visas were revoked by Sri Lanka in February of this year over the fact that Russian-run businesses had “whites only” policies, also feel that they are victims.
"Putin is just a metastasis, but no one wants to look for the cancer. For many in the West, Navalny is a very simple solution, because they like to believe that there is an easy way out of this mess. No one wants to acknowledge that the long and difficult work with Russia and its imperialist legacy will only begin after the war," Mariam Naiem.
There’s always been some rumored suspicion that Navalny enjoys the tacit support of at least part of the elite. In 2012, the correspondence of some of the leaders of the liberal opposition was published, and it spoke of the possible financing of Navalny by a group of prominent oligarchs, many responsible for Putin’s rise to power. It is important to note that Navalny’s criticism of social inequality never turned towards the ruling establishment; his social populism never crossed that line. Sharp criticism Putin’s corruption and luxury does not mean radical social or economic changes. Navalny was against revising the results of the privatization of the 1990s or the redistribution of the national income. The most he ever conceded was a small “compensation fee” that some oligarchs must pay to legitimize the property seized in the 1990s.
I am not a fan of conspiracy theories, but thinking back to the almost triumphant return from near-death to his people with “Victory” (the name of the Russian low-cost airline, whose plane Navalny flew) and Putin’s recent comments regarding immediate agreement to exchange Navalny supposedly without even knowing the return recipients, all through the prism of the upcoming election, one that Putin did not want to risk in any way, thinking of the length of time it took for the authorities to hand over Navalny’s body to his mother and knowing that in the extremely harsh conditions of Polar Wolf, anything could happen… I have to at least wonder for a minute.
Narrating the online coverage of the funeral, Leonid Volkov, a close friend and aide to Navalny, tried to summon some optimism as the day unfolded. “They can’t kill an idea. They can’t kill hope,” he said, though his voice sounded more pained than defiant.
In February 2020, in Chita, eastern Russia, a man was sentenced to 14 years in prison for murdering an 18-year old woman. He was later recruited to fight in Ukraine. After completing his 12-month contract, he received a pardon and returned home, where he promptly killed a 22-year old woman, earning another 14-year sentence. You know the solution, he is already planning to return to the war.
I know that this is not what Volkov meant, but that is the idea they can’t kill, the deeply rooted ethnonationalist imperialism of the Russian nature.
My Russian Soul
Some might say I have a Russian soul. That means my soul is tortured, full of anguish; it loves and hates fiercely, takes nothing for granted.
Dostoyevsky said, “The Russian soul is a dark place.”
When I lost my mind the first time, Russia drove me to that point. Every time after that, Russia lingered, haunting, the taste of the slate sky endangering my mouth.
Shannon O’Connor
I am aware that quite a few of my references are very niche but in this case, I wanted to be very clear that we must separate the Romanovs dynasty from the Holstein Gottorp dynasty.
Yes, I am aware that Amnesty International reversed it’s decision later citing Kremlin’s use of the change for propaganda purposes. Well, no shit!
This and other videos are still available on Navalany’s Youtube account. If you believe his opinions and perspectives changes since then, I’d like to ask you a simple question - why, then neither Navalny nor anyone on his team had taken a few minutes over more than 15 years to remove or delete these videos??
I’d argue that it’s Moscow and St. Petersburg establishment.
The theoretical of Navalny being the democratic liberator of the nation from the despotism of Putin, is a picture perfect of the alternate history fanboys and girls where Kirov is elected at the head of the Politburo at the 1934 Congress and Stalin’s repressions never take place. Back in my college days, I’ve researched these alternate history claims and just like Navalny, Kirov’s image has been significantly whitewashed by the Western historians. I won’t digress further, but in short, the thesis of my paper was that if Kirov was the head of the Politburo, the all likelihood was that Soviet Union would’ve taken a very sharp turn to far-right and aligned itself with Germany and the Axis powers.